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Are the Odds of Justice “Stacked” Against Them? Challenges and
Opportunities for Securing Land Claims by Smallholder Farmers in
Myanmar
SiuSue Mark*
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, The Hague, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT: In 2012, the Government of Myanmar passed the Farmland Law and the Vacant,
Fallow, Virgin Land Law, with an aim to increase investment in land through the formalization of
a land market. Land titling is often considered “the natural end point of land rights
formalization.”1 A major obstacle to achieving this in Myanmar is its legacy of multiple regimes
which has created “stacked laws.”2 This term refers to a situation in which a country has multiple
layers of laws that exist simultaneously, leading to conﬂicts and contradictions in the legal system.
This ambiguity is often manipulated by those who have more access to political and economic
resources, particularly those who received large land concessions under the 1988–2010 military
regime. In this context, this paper attempts to answer the question: In Myanmar, how do
smallholder farmers engage with a stacked legal framework, which is ambiguous and unfairly
applied, to defend themselves against land dispossession? The analysis seeks to contribute to the
literature on the contest over land control and access through an analysis of how a stacked legal
framework can be used to further disenfranchise farmers by elites, or on the contrary, by farmers
to gradually reclaim this control through strategic political maneuvering.
Keywords: Myanmar land laws; stacked law; land conﬁscations; land dispossession;
smallholder farmers
Introduction
In 2012, the Government of Myanmar passed the Farmland Law and the Vacant, Fallow, Virgin
(VFV) Land Law. The purpose of these laws was to create a regulated private property system
through the issuance of land use certiﬁcates (LUCs), also known as “Form Seven.” This in
turn created a formalized land market. Even though landowners used to have different forms
of documentation for their land,3 nothing like Form Seven existed prior to 2012.4 Moreover,
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1Hall et al. 2011, 35.
2Roquas 2002, 11.
3These included tax receipts, Form 105 (a certiﬁed map), and farmers’ booklets issued by the Settlement and
Land Records Department (SLRD) stating farmers’ rights and duties on their land.
4Author interview with former SLRD Directors on 23 May 2015.
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although farmers had bought and sold land before 2012, this was not technically permitted
under the law.5 The passage of the Farmland Law set up a regulated land market through
the standardization of a private, predominantly individualized, land-use certiﬁcation and regis-
tration system. LUC holders are now allowed to sell, exchange, inherit, mortgage, and lease
their land.
Land titling is often considered “the natural end point of land rights formalization.”6 This
thinking has dominated most governments and development agencies since Hernando De Soto
popularized the idea that the developmental successes of countries with advanced market econ-
omies have largely relied on strong, legally-enforceable property rights, without which assets,
particularly land, would not have catalyzed economic growth.7 After the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis, the state has been attributed a more central role as regulator of a land market to
enhance market efﬁciency. Along these lines, efﬁciency requires alienable private property
titles, which is the foundation of creating a competitive land rental and sales market.8 This main-
stream model of land governance argues that private property rights, supported by strong legal
institutions, state regulation, and a free market, allow individuals who are more “ﬁt” to use the
land to invest in it.
Various scholars have argued that a private property model of land governance, which
prioritizes the economic value of land as a central element in development, is problematic.9
In Myanmar, many communities attach social, cultural, spiritual, and historical value to
land, not just monetary. As such, in many parts of Myanmar, particularly in upland ethnic min-
ority states, land is managed with an emphasis on communal tenure. In following the trend of
mainstream development thinking in which laws are used to reshape economic and political
institutions in an effort to spur growth, Myanmar’s current land regulatory framework also
requires non-marketable property to become marketable. The World Bank’s emphasis on the
role of strong state law in development (good governance) has been criticized as a way to
appear to move beyond the failures caused by neo-liberal policies under which markets oper-
ated with little state regulation, while still promoting many of the same neo-liberal assump-
tions.10 In this case, strong state law cannot undo many fundamental issues of
mainstreaming a private-property titling program unless other issues, such as equity, are
tackled. This leads to another common critique leveled at this mainstream land model: that
it pays scant attention to power, as some people gain more beneﬁts in a land market which
lacks state limits on concentration.11
While recognizing critiques of this mainstream model of land governance, I do not focus on
the impact of state law on land managed under customary land tenure. These areas can be found
across large swathes of the uplands of Chin State, Kachin State, Shan State, Karen State, Bago
Region, Kayah State, parts of Rakhine State, and Special Administrative Areas such as Naga-
land.12 Instead, I focus on areas where state laws have been strongest in administrating property,
5The 1953 Land Nationalization Act did not permit the exchange of land. But because people needed to buy
and sell land, a quasi-legal land market arose. This is explained further on in the paper.
6Hall et al. 2010, 35.
7De Soto 2000.
8Deininger and Binswanger 1999.
9See for example Borras 2006 or Musembi 2007.
10Krever 2011.
11Borras 2006.
12In some parts of these states and regions, where farmers practice sedentary farming, local authorities might
also issue land use certiﬁcates. This process has tended to be much slower given the armed conﬂict, insecur-
ity, and contested authorities that characterize these areas.
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and where people have been familiar with the concept of individual private property13 for centu-
ries.14 These tend to be in the Burman-dominant lowland plains.
In these areas, a major obstacle to a more efﬁcient and equitable land governance system is the
existence of “stacked laws.”15 This term refers to multiple layers of revoked and active laws
layered on top of each other over time, often creating conﬂicts and contradictions in the legal fra-
mework. In the context of land issues, stacked laws can be used by farmers to argue for their
claims, but more often than not, legal ambiguity is used to the detriment of smallholder
farmers by the more powerful, especially economic elites who materially beneﬁtted under the
1988–2010 military regime.
The rest of this paper attempts to answer the following three related questions:
(1) Broadly speaking, how did a weak legal framework rife with stacked laws arise during the
last four regimes in Myanmar: British colonial rule (1824–1948), the post-independence
period (1948–1962), military rule (1962–2011) and the current reform period (2011-
present)?
(2) How is the ambiguity of this stacked legal framework used to the detriment of farmers?
(3) How do smallholder farmers engage with a stacked legal framework, both inside and
outside the court system, to defend themselves against land dispossession?
Drawing from secondary research and ﬁeldwork carried out between 2013 and 2015 in the
Ayeyarwady and Mandalay Regions, I consider conﬂicts at two levels: intra-community conﬂicts
between farmers and local elites, and those between local communities and outsiders (such as
private companies, state actors, and the military) in land conﬁscation cases. My ﬁeld research
includes interviews with pro-bono lawyers and legal aid workers who provide legal assistance
to farmers land conﬂicts, interviews with civil society and farmer association leaders, and a
review of newspaper coverage of land conﬂicts and cases.
Theorizing Stacked Laws in a “Law-of-Status” Society
Esther Roquas coined the term “stacked laws” to describe the property regimes she observed
during her research on land conﬂicts in Honduras. She drew from the concept of “legal pluralism,”
which refers to “more than one legal order, based on different sources of ultimate validity and
maintained by forms of organization other than the state, within one political organization.”16
Roquas pointed out that pluralism within a legal framework can also be caused by different
laws created over time which exist simultaneously despite contradictions between them, and vari-
ations in the way that state ofﬁcials implement and enforce laws and policies – variations that
often become normalized over time.17 In her conceptualization of stacked laws, instead of
earlier laws being replaced by later ones, or multiple laws merging into a ﬂuid comprehensive
legal framework, legal frameworks come to have layers of different elements which people
13Even in the lowlands, there are deﬁned plots under communal management, such as village grazing land,
but cultivators use state-administrated private property model of managing nearly all the farmland.
14From the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries, people in Burma proper lived under the absolute rule of
Burmese kings who ruled with dhammathats (Leckie and Simperingham, 2009). Kings claimed ownership
of all land, and also extracted surpluses from farmers who were allowed tenancy rights to the land through
cultivation. But even during this era, an informal land market was already developed in many areas.
15Roquas 2002, 11.
16Benda-Beckman 2002, 37.
17Roquas 2002, 19–22.
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tease out and strategically employ. By doing so, individuals and communities establish the val-
idity of their claims to land based not only on current active laws, but also by invoking their
understanding of older laws and policies that may no longer be legally valid. This leads to differ-
ing interpretations of land rights between farmers and ofﬁcials.
The concept of stacked laws is helpful in explaining Myanmar’s legal framework, which has
evolved over four regimes, from 1876 until the present. During these decades, new laws, execu-
tive orders, and policies have been stacked upon existing ones, creating a high degree of disjoint-
edness in the legal framework. For example, seventy-three laws and regulations related to land
governance existed prior to the most recent land laws in 2012. In addition, state ofﬁcials have
often been quiescent to practices that were not permitted by written law, but eventually
became quasi-ofﬁcial. A good example of this arose in response to the 1953 Land Nationalization
Act, which restricted land sales.18 These transfers typically were made with store-bought con-
tracts, known as “ten-kyat contracts,” that bore close resemblance to state-sanctioned contracts.
The transactions were witnessed, marked with the signature and seal of a village leader or a town-
ship administrator, and secured with a payment of 10,000 MMK.19 In addition, these transfers
required the land to be in use, although many farmers who purchased lands under such contracts
were not able to do because of lack of capital. By inference, farmers who sold their lands at this
time argued that they were breaking state rules and therefore should sell it to someone who would
be able to cultivate this land.
In the present day, farmers’ understanding of the legal framework is inﬂuenced by this history.
When individuals or communities defend their land against conﬁscation, they utilize not only
current laws, but also older laws and policies, some of which may no longer be active. Most com-
monly, farmers reference the 1964 Executive Order 1/64 that decreed that anyone farming a piece
of land for more than ﬁve years, regardless of documentation, owned the use rights to that land.
This decree exists in a grey zone of legality, since it was promulgated in direct reference to the
1963 Tenancy Law, which was revoked by the 2012 Farmland Law. “Even our member of Parlia-
ment asked us if we are still applying this order,” said a SLRD ofﬁcer in the Ayeyarwady
Region.20 In bringing up revoked laws and policies, farmers may argue that they were legitimate
at the time the conﬁscation happened and should be considered in renewed conﬂicts over rightful
ownership of land.
Ambiguity in such a system often does not work to farmers’ advantage, because the powerful
can more effectively exploit this, resulting in a rule-by-law system.21 This is related to the critique
that the mainstream property model fails to address power relations that often require the active
intervention of the state. This derives from a social order that has historically valued people
according to their status and connections to each other, what Maung Maung Gyi calls a “law-
of-status society.”22 In such a society, “A person is never viewed as neutral member of society
possessing rights and privileges as a human being…Respect and attention is regulated according
to the social scale.”23 Against this context, rule of law does not exist. The legal system doles out
18GRET 2014.
19The exchange rate used throughout the paper is 1,000 MMK to 1 USD, to account for the fact that the
exchange rate has ﬂuctuated from between 700 MMK and 1300 MMK per USD in the last ﬁve years
(2011–2016).
20Author interview on 19 February 2016 in Ayeyarwady Region.
21In contrast to rule of law, a contrast emphasized by Lee Ching Kwan, for example, in her research on
Chinese labor movements (Lee 2007).
22Gyi 1983, 170.
23Ibid.
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justice in response to the pressures exerted on it in a complex political play that involves an array
of actors, including media, domestic and international civil society, and religious leaders.24
After many years in which Myanmar people lived under a coercive apparatus, people do not
just suddenly develop the awareness or daring to engage with the law – an institution created and
enforced by the state itself. In this regard, state-society relations have to shift in a way which
creates openings for such engagements to occur. It is with such openings that “rightful resist-
ance”25 emerges. As a “critique within the hegemony,”26 rural communities opt to go through
“approved channels and use a regime’s policies and legitimating myths to justify their deﬁance,”
while at the same time trying to turn them into instruments for their own empowerment.27 For
example, when asked why they started to complain about conﬁscations of their land that had
occurred decades ago, some farmers replied, “We heard the President say that he will support
the return of illegally-conﬁscated land to the farmers. We also heard about the Parliament
setting up a commission in August 2012 to investigate these cases.”28 In a sense, when
farmers engage with the law, they are calling for the state to apply its own laws fairly, transpar-
ently, and consistently – to shift away from a “rule-by-law” society to a “rule-of-law” society.
Stacked Laws over Four Regimes
The current system of land governance in Myanmar is very much inﬂuenced by the system put
into place during the colonial era (1824–1948). Great Britain, after it seized control of Lower
Burma in 1852, used locally cultivated rice to feed its own industrial workers as well as planta-
tion workers across its empire.29 In order to extract paddy and taxes from Burmese farmers, the
British introduced a system to assess individual land holdings,30 via the passage of the 1876
Lower Burma Land and Revenue Act. By granting the right to inherit and trade land after con-
tinuous use for twelve years, this law introduced the British system of property rights. Admin-
istrators introduced a scheme in which “the land of every cultivator was to be measured up,
and he was to receive a statement showing that he possessed so many ﬁelds and so much
garden land.”31 The SLRD, created in 1906, administered the colonial tax collection system
by issuing receipts for taxes collected on cultivated plots included in cadastral maps. Tax
receipts delineated land holdings by plot, size, type, village, village tract names, and the
name of the cultivator.32
Another important law enacted by the British was the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, which
established a legal basis for compensation when land was acquired by the state for itself or a
private developer. In today’s land conﬂicts, many communities look to and invoke the 1894
Land Acquisition Act as it strengthens their claims for compensation for conﬁscations that
occurred prior to 2012, when this was the only law regulating acquisitions.
Following independence from the United Kingdom, the 1947 Constitution of the Union of
Burma established the state as the ultimate owner of all natural resources and land. This claim
was reafﬁrmed in the 1974 and 2008 Constitutions. The 1953 Land Nationalization Act
24See for example Cheesman 2015; Prasse-Freeman 2014.
25O’Brien 1996.
26Ibid., 34.
27Ibid., 33.
28Author interview in Ayeyarwady Region on 24 November 2014.
29Wolf 1982, 319–320.
30Furnivall [1939] 1991, 116–131.
31Ibid., 124.
32GRET 2014.
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nationalized all land, made landlordism illegal, and leased land to cultivators under a land to the
tiller policy.33 This law also banned the sale, mortgage, and division of land.
Not long after the military coup of 2 March 1962, General Ne Win declared the “Burmese
Way to Socialism,” which articulated the three central concepts of the regime: “nationalism,
socialism and Buddhism.”34 The 1963 Tenancy Law deﬁned farmers as tenants on state-owned
land, and further extended the granting of land to cultivators. In addition, the Farmer’s Rights Pro-
tection Law of 1963 was designed to prevent conﬁscation of land by parties other than the military
government, in the event of debt default by farmers. Also during this period, a number of direc-
tives were signed by senior generals, the most notable being Executive Order 1/64.
The military government enforced a paddy procurement policy from 1974 until 2003 under
which farmers had to sell twelve baskets of paddy per acre to the government at a below-
market price to feed civil servants and soldiers, and for export.35 Those who could not meet
this quota had their land conﬁscated and allocated to other “more productive” farmers, which
increased land concentration.36 At the same time, in order to reach even higher paddy output
levels, military commanders encouraged farmers to cultivate on what was termed “VFV” as
well as on reserve forest land. Because the SLRD has not updated its cadastral maps since the
1960s, many farmers have never received documents for their use rights on these lands.
Another reason for a lack of documentation is because some farmers attempted to evade the
harsh quotas by under-reporting the size of their plots. Today, farmers who participated in
these government programs during the military era argue that they were only following the
orders of their regional commanders at the time and have rights to compensation.
The rice quota policy contributed to the decline of the sector from its heyday right before
World War II.37 As a result, to harmonize with its ofﬁcial declaration of a transition to a
market economy in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)38 passed the
1991 “Wasteland Instructions”39 to encourage private investment in agriculture production.40
Notably, the military also suspended the 1974 Constitution from 1988 until the ratiﬁcation of a
new Constitution in May 2008.41 With the military not having to be accountable to any laws,
this period was marked by rampant and unchecked land conﬁscation – a legacy against which
struggles are carried out today.
33Government of Myanmar 1894 Land Acquisition Act; Author interview with retired SLRD ofﬁcers on 23
May 2015.
34Steinberg 1982, 76.
35Hudson-Rodd et al. 2003.
36Thawnghmung 2004.
37According to Than 1990, Myanmar’s rice exports were 3.177 million tons at this time, and gradually
declined over the years– the country exported 1.676 million tons between 1961 and 1962 but only 0.3
million tons between 1987 and 1988, the year the SLORC took power, followed by 50,000 tons the next
year. This is a ten-fold drop since the 1930s.
38The SLORC took power from the BSPP after the 1988 student demonstrations. In 1992, General Than
Shwe became the head of the SLORC, which changed its name to the State Peace and Development
Council in 1997.
39While these lands were hardly “wastelands” to those communities who used them for their daily livelihood,
this idea, ﬁrst brought to Myanmar in 1893 via the British who used this term to legitimize their desire to
make all land proﬁtable, has been used by the state ever since to justify reallocations of large swathes of
land – whether it be for feeding the military in the post-independence years or to capture large revenues (Fer-
guson 2014).
40See SLORC Notiﬁcation No. 44/91.
41Another period when there was no Constitution was 1962–1974.
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During this transition period the state adopted a policy of “state-mediated capitalism”42 and
determined the nature, scope, and pace of this transition by involving only those close to the
center of power. Lucrative deals involved military conglomerates such as the Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation
(MEC), government administrative bodies, and crony companies. These deals also involved
foreign investments from countries that did not adhere to sanctions against Myanmar. The
deals included oil and gas exploitation, the construction of hydropower dams, roads and other
infrastructure, and agribusiness investment – all of which required displacement of many
people from their land, nearly always with no compensation.
After the 2011 elections, the Thein Sein government passed the 2012 Farmland Law, which
authorized the Farmland Administration Body (FAB) to issue certiﬁcates to cultivators, house-
holds, and organizations. A holder of this certiﬁcate has the right to sell, exchange, inherit, and
lease land, as well as to access credit.43 If a farmer breaches the conditions of use, the FAB
may impose ﬁnes and take away land use rights. The law also allows the state, through the
FAB, to conﬁscate land when in the interest of the state. While this law provides more detailed
guidance for calculating compensation, challenges remain in calculating the actual market rate
of land values, given the lack of systematic transaction records. Signiﬁcantly, since “no proceed-
ings shall be ﬁled at any court for any matter carried out in good faith in accord with this Law or
rules made under this law to the members of various levels of Administrative Body of the Farm-
land” (Chapter 13, section 40), smallholder farmers have no right to seek an independent appeal
process.
The VFV Law regulates the leasing of land considered “vacant,” “fallow,” or “virgin” for
alternative use. Public forests can be allocated under the VFV Law. Smaller concessions of up
to ﬁfty acres can be granted by regional authorities with little central oversight. The law also
allows domestic and foreign enterprises, and government and non-government entities to apply
for up to 5000 acres at one time, with maximum holdings of 50,000 acres on leases of thirty
years that can be extended. Chapter III (30a) of this law decrees that farmers can apply to the
regional government for permission to lease up to ten acres of VFV land. Article 25(B) of the
VFV Law recognizes existing use of land by farmers should there be a conﬂict between the exist-
ing tenant and a party that claims the land. Since most farmers do not have written records for
VFV land on which they have farmed, Article 25(B) can be useful in securing some degree of
compensation in land disputes with companies negotiated out-of-court – but this clause is
often ignored.
The above sections show how the current legal framework was developed, in which laws,
directives, and policies (and quasi-legal practices) have been stacked onto each other over
time, creating ambiguity and often conﬂict. Adding to this, given previous policies which encour-
aged cultivation of VFV land and population growth, and led to a lack of resources allocated to
the Ministry of Irrigation and Agriculture,44 large expanses of land under cultivation were
excluded from cadastral maps or “kwin” maps.45 While a little over nine million LUCs had
been issued by January 2016, many farming households still did not hold certiﬁcates for the
lands they cultivate.46
42Jones 2014, 3.
43Though the by-laws are pending, the 2014 Farmers Rights and Protection Law states that farmers can grow
what they want on agricultural land.
44The names of many government ministries and departments have changed since the new government took
power in April 2016.
45Author interview with former SLRD Directions on 23 May 2015.
46Data from Union-level SLRD ofﬁce dated January 2016.
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A case in Nyaungdone village tract in Maubin District in the Delta demonstrates how stacked
laws and policies impact farmers. In 2001, military commanders instructed thirty-nine farming
households to expand cultivation to VFV land. Some paid the annual tax of 3000 MMK, but
many did not due to various reasons. Some were intimidated by government ofﬁcers, while
others did not have the wherewithal, time and money to make the trip to tax ofﬁces. In 2006,
an outside investor applied for this land under the 1991 Wasteland Instructions. In their
defense, the farmers argued that they had spent their meager savings and labor to clear this
land. “Being thick and wild area with high bushes, we had to take twenty days for an acre clear-
ance… bushes reached up to eight feet…we had to clear collectively… that was not easy task at
all,” said one farmer involved in this case. They also invoked Executive Order 1/64. The farmers’
claim to the land received the backing of village leaders, but township ofﬁcials eventually decided
to award the land to the outside investor.47
Stacked Laws Against Farmers
Whether large-scale grabs by the military, government bodies, and companies, or smaller ones
carried out by local elites, actors use stacked laws strategically against smallholder farmers by
emphasizing some elements while ignoring others. Given the state’s limited capacity to deﬁne
and enforce regulations nuanced enough to ﬁt the complexity on the ground, “fuzzy zones of
compromise, accommodation and bribery are the rule rather than the exception” as people
attempt to negotiate weak and contradictory laws in their favor.48 In a “law-of-status”
society, those who can use their political and monetary resources do so to ensure that the
law works in their favor.
Article 25 (b) of the VFV Law states that farmers who have used VFV land for an established
period of time, ofﬁcially or not, are entitled to compensation when this land is involved in a land
conﬂict with a third party. However, rarely has this clause been followed or enforced. Instead, land
conﬁscators choose to emphasize part (a) of the same article, which says that action will be taken
against local cultivators causing “dispute, obstruction, trespass, and mischief” to those granted
formal rights by the state to utilize VFV land. The net result is that land conﬁscators turn to
the police and courts to legitimize their grabs while criminalizing the farmers.
Most land-related cases that come to the attention of legal aid providers involve farmers
charged under Section 427 of the Myanmar Criminal Code for trespassing or 447 for damage
to private property.49 Evoking national security, the government at times charges farmers who
are unwilling to leave conﬁscated land under the more serious section 505(b) which involves
“defamation of the state.” Once charged, farmers are immediately put in jail until they are
bailed out, thus intimidating them and other farmers from taking further action to regain their
lands. As of May 2015, 944 farmers faced imprisonment under this charge, according to the
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.50
Other examples demonstrate the way elements of a complex legal system can be selectively
applied to the detriment of farmers. In Kanbaung Village in the Ayeyarwady Division, farmers
possessed tax receipts for land until 1992, at which time their land had been conﬁscated
without compensation. The FAB sided with the company which had received a formal land
grant and did not acknowledge any violation of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act or the farmers’
47Case reported by Share Mercy civil-society organization in Yangon on 14 May, 2015.
48Hall et al. 2010, 16.
49Author interview with legal-aid provider on 6 December 2014.
50Email exchange with AAPP on 24 May, 2015.
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tax receipts. Instead, the FAB selectively applied Executive Order 1/64, and said that since the
farmers had not farmed the land for the previous ﬁve years, they had lost their use rights.51 In
the words of the head of one local NGO supporting farmers’ issues said, “according to new
laws, there is no more land grabbing, as the laws are used to legitimize them.”52
The selective use of law has been facilitated by a growing pool of land brokers. In Bago
Region, it is common practice for village leaders to receive a commission for each transaction
of 100,000 MMK (USD 100) and the SLRD 200,000 MMK (USD 200), compared to no more
than 30,000 MMK (USD thirty) prior to 2012.53 Similarly, in Madeya Township in Mandalay,
the Great Wall Sugar Company paid land administration authorities to approve a VFV certiﬁcate,
overriding the claims of twenty households that had cultivated this land for ﬁve years prior to the
arrival of the company in 2000.54
Finally, the use of laws to legitimize land grabbing is further aggravated by limited capacity in
local administration across the country. For example, in one township in Mon State, the SLRD
ofﬁce was supposed to distribute 33,158 titles in fourteen months, with only twenty-two staff
and a limited budget.55 In addition to limited human resources and a short timeframe, the
SLRD continues to use paper records and outdated maps. To meet work targets within these con-
straints, it took shortcuts such as not verifying maps with visits to the villages impacted by its
decisions. In some cases, local elites are able to exploit the administration’s stretched capacity.
In Mon State’s Thaton Township, a relatively well-off man secured the oral testimonies of
alleged witnesses in order to grab the land of his neighbor, a widow who had been living and cul-
tivating on her land for decades. With falsiﬁed documents, he convinced the village tract leader to
endorse his application, which subsequently was approved at the township level.56
Farmers’ Political Approach to Laws
For a number of reasons, it is still uncommon for farmers to utilize laws to protect themselves
against dispossession. Farming communities tend to have little information about laws and are
deterred by the high cost of court litigation, particularly for civil suits. Said one pro-bono
lawyer, “We only go to criminal court as defendants, not as prosecution. There are very few
civil cases, and they are very costly. It is not a sustainable way to protect farmers.”57 On the
other hand, the availability of lawyers to take on these cases is also limited, given recent
history in which lawyers seen as too political were disbarred by the military government. Cur-
rently, court cases initiated by farmers are often subsidized by donors, usually development
agencies working on rule of law issues who support legal aid services.58 Additionally, township
administrators who report to the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs pressure judges to
not make decisions against those in power. As a result, there is only one known court case,
described later on, involving farmers in Kachin state that resulted in compensation.59
51Author ﬁeld visits in Ayeyarwady Region in November 2014.
52Author interview on 21 November 2014.
53Case presented on 23 December 2014 in the FAO ofﬁce in Yangon by a land expert who carried out a study
on land tenure administration for FAO in Myanmar.
54Author ﬁeld visit to Madeya Township, 1 October 2015.
55Case presented on 23 December 2014 by a land expert who carried out a study on land tenure adminis-
tration for FAO in Myanmar.
56Email from Land Core Group member on 22 September 2015.
57Author interview with legal-aid provider on 1 October 2015.
58For example, as of 2014 year-end, the Myanmar Legal Aid Network had an estimated 30 pro-bono cases
for land-related conﬂicts.
59Often, opposing parties agree to settle cases through negotiation prior in order to avoid starting a court case.
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Nevertheless, as explained below, this has not prevented farmers from initiating a number of civil
suits employing a mix of different laws.
There are more instances in which farmers have had land returned as a result of the Par-
liamentary Land Conﬁscation Investigation Commission’s work (although this has also been
an imperfect process). Negotiations carried out by communities outside of the legal system
have also prevented or delayed land takings or resulted in fairer monetary settlements. For
example, compensation negotiations for land taken for the Kyaukphyu Special Economic
Zone in Rakhine State resulted in an increased settlement of four million MMK (USD
4000) per acre for farmers.60
Nonetheless, legal cases in which farmers strategically engage with different laws to protect
themselves against dispossession are gradually increasing. The following sections will address a
number of factors that are likely contributing to this phenomenon: (1) the evolving nature of the
judiciary; (2) the types of legal strategies available to farming communities; (3) alliances with
media and other civil society groups; and (4) responses by the state.
Evolving Judiciary
In the last few years, there has been growing perception that the judiciary must not be subsumed
under the executive and the military, as well as a growing call for judicial independence and
reform.61 In August 2015, a campaign was started by the Nay Pyi Taw Legal Support Group
against the appointment of twenty military ofﬁcers to the Supreme Court.62 Demonstrating rela-
tively more openness in the judicial system than under the military regime, one lawyer who pre-
viously had been imprisoned twice on contempt charges said that courts do not throw lawyers into
jail as readily as they used to (Figure 1).63
Defense lawyers play a vital role in shaping the outcomes in land conﬁscation cases. Given a
history in which politically active lawyers were punished by the military government, lawyers
tend to shy away from appearing politically motivated in any way. As such, lawyers employ a
strategy in which legal arguments are crafted to appear to uphold laws. Because this is done
with an awareness that the laws themselves offer only weak protection to farmers, the cases
are also chosen selectively so as to not only show weaknesses in implementation of these
laws, but also weaknesses in the laws as perceived by some legal professionals.64 For
example, a weakness often noted by lawyers in the 2012 Farmland Law is that the FAB is a
“closed system” which does not allow for an external appeals process. Even though many
lawyers know that they have little chance of winning a case, it is through the process of taking
on cases that lawyers indirectly advocate for changes to a political culture in which the strong
use laws to their advantage against the weak, as well as for amendments to the laws themselves.
“It is like demonstrators who keep on protesting –we do it even though we are likely to lose,” said
a pro-bono lawyer representing farmers charged with trespassing.65
60Discussion with Rakhine civil society leader on 25 December, 2014.
61See article http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/18050-judicial-system-in-
need-of-major-redress-says-pyithu-hluttaw-committee-review.html (accessed 10 December, 2015).
62See article http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/16400-yellow-ribbons-seek-
an-end-to-militarised-judiciary.html (accessed 10 December, 2015).
63Author interview with legal aid provider on 12 August 2015.
64Author interview with legal aid provider on 20 December 2014; the same statements were made at a work-
shop with pro-bono lawyers at a land and the law workshop held on 15–16 July 2015.
65Author interview with lawyer on 11 July 2015.
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Farmers Engagement with Stacked Laws- In and Out of Courts
Compared to the hundreds of criminal cases that have been ﬁled against farmers, there are very
few cases in which farmers have initiated legal action in order to get their land back or to win
compensation. One lawyer defending farmers estimates that since the passage of the 2012 land
laws, there have been only six civil cases.66 Because these cases take several years to complete,
their results are still pending.
Prior to 2012, in only one known civil case did a judge rule in the farmers’ favor. This was a
2009 case involving 148 farmers and the Yuzana Conglomerate, which had been granted
200,000 acres in the Hukawng Valley in Kachin State. The calculation of compensation was
based on an assessment of the average values in the area, resulting in 80,000 MMK (USD 80)
per acre of paddy land, 60,000 MMK (USD 60) for ya land (farmland for crops other than rice),
and 30,000 MMK (USD 30) for garden land; 150,000 MMK (USD 150) for a new house; and
20,000 MMK (USD 20) for the temporary huts constructed on ﬁelds. Because there were no
other laws at the time, and the 1894 Land Acquisition Act did not provide speciﬁc guidance, the
suit was based on tort law per the Burma Judiciary Law (section 13–3) and Civil Procedure Law
(sections 16–19). However, the lawyer for the case estimates that, as of late 2015, thirty percent
of the households had not accepted payment, and they are still demanding return of the land.
The few attempts to challenge administrative decisions by applying to the Supreme Court for
a Constitutional Writ have been unsuccessful to date.67 While farmers cannot directly appeal a
decision made by the FAB, lawyers can challenge land conﬁscations by arguing that the
parties responsible for conﬁscations fail to adhere to legal requirements. Cases which farmers
Figure 1. A lawyer counsels farmers on their land conﬁscation problems. Credit: SiuSue Mark.
66Author interview with lawyer on 12 December 2015. Two cases are in Sagaing Division, two are in Maubin
in Ayeyarwady Division, and two in Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Division.
67“Land and Law in Myanmar: A Practitioner’s Perspective,” prepared by the NGO Partner Asia, 15–16 July
2015.
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can provide some type of proof of land ownership, usually tax receipts, have the strongest chance
of success. Farmers also refer to the principles of protection in old or revoked laws. For example, a
rights-based group called the Myanmar Democratic Network lamented that the 1963 Farmers’
Protection Law was repealed. One network member said: “Before 2010, people were poor, but
now people are so vulnerable that they cannot crawl out of poverty at this rate.”68
In the 2012 Farmland and VFV Land law, some articles that offer speciﬁc types of protections
to farmers include:
Farmland Law’s chapter 8 by-laws give more speciﬁc guidance than the 1894 Land Acquisition Act
for calculating compensation
Article 25 b of the VFV Law says that farmers who have used VFV land for an established
period of time, ofﬁcially or not, are entitled to negotiation and
compensation when this land is involved in a land conﬂict
with a third party
Article 32 of the Farmland Law says should a project take more land than is needed, the original
owner should get it back
Article 16b of the VFV Law says land that is unused for four years must be returned to the
state
Several recent cases highlight the legal strategies employed by farmers for the return of land or
compensation from government, military or companies. One case is in Sake Do Ta Ra Township
in Magwe Division, in which nineteen villages with 5,000 people are seeking compensation from
the government for a dam project begun in 2010. In 2013, legal aid providers mobilized villagers
and provided the funds (USD 1800) for this case. These communities reference the Myanmar
Constitution Chapter 14, Article 445, which decrees that previous government actions are the
responsibility of the current government. Some farmers have invoked the 2012 Farmland Law
Figure 2. Farmers meet to discuss ways to respond to land conﬁscations. Credit: SiuSue Mark.
68Author interview on 24 November 2014 in Ayeyarwady Region.
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to retroactively claim compensation from the start of the dam project. The 1908 Limitation Act,
amended in 2014, allows up to twelve years for a party to sue for damages to immovable property.
The 2012 Farmland Law (Chapter Eight) states that compensation payments should be calculated
based on three times the value of the average crop output per acre of land conﬁscated; two times
the value of any improvements made on the land; and the market value of the land. Because land
values had changed signiﬁcantly since the time of conﬁscation, farmers involved in this case use
current market value and backdate the total amount of compensation to the time the land was con-
ﬁscated. Schedule 12 of the 2012 Farmland Law calculates compensation based on present-day
market values. An exhibit from one case ﬁled showed that total value is based on a multiplication
of acres lost, price for that type of land, and total years since the land was conﬁscated.69
Farmers are also using laws to regain their land without even going to court. The Letpadaung
Copper Mine, a joint-venture of the state, a Chinese company named Wanbao, and UMEHL, and
involves over 7000 acres of farmland conﬁscated in 2010 in Sagaing Region. After a November
2012 crackdown on demonstrators, a government investigation committee headed by Aung San
Suu Kyi determined that the project should continue, but with revisions to the terms including
more compensation to local communities and a greater share for the government. Though
many farmers accepted an increased compensation package, some villagers continue to refuse
to move. In 2016, they wrote letters to the township, district-level General Administration Depart-
ment, and the police to claim their land. In these letters, they cite four laws: the 1894 Land Acqui-
sition Act, the 1953 Land Nationalization Act (though revoked by the 2012 Farmland Law, this
was still active at the time land was conﬁscated), the 2012 VFV Law (Article 16B), and the Farm-
land Law (Article 32). Based on these legal arguments, they have been able to reoccupy and farm
one hundred acres of the conﬁscated land.70 While this is a small percentage of the 7000 acres in
dispute, this case is unique in how it demonstrates a creative use of laws outside the court.
Yet another type of legal strategy uses contract law. As noted above, store-bought contracts
were and are still used by some farmers when they mortgage their land. These contracts can be
brought forth in some litigation cases where farmers lost their lands to a moneylender. A case
in Myeik in Thaningtharyi Region demonstrates this. Starting in 2013, 189 farmers in three vil-
lages were charged with trespassing on land from which they had been ejected after losing this to a
local money lender. According to the contracts they had signed with this money lender, they
would not have to pay interest on their land. Additionally, the contracts stated that the money
lender could use the farmers’ Form105 (a certiﬁed map issued by the SLRD) as collateral for
the loans. Many signed without understanding the implications of these clauses. Their lawyer
has argued these contracts are invalid on the grounds that the money lender is engaged in an unre-
gistered illegal business under the 1945 Money Lenders Act. Prior to the case actually going to
court, the moneylender agreed to start out-of-court negotiations with the farmers.71
The Role of Civil Society & Media
While most legal advocates avoid any appearance of activism, large land conﬂicts continue to
draw the attention of civil society groups and media, who actively politicize and amplify local
communities’ demands for justice. Civil society groups that are involved with land conﬂicts
69Author interview with lawyer on 12 December 2015.
70A lawyer interviewed on 12 December 2015 identiﬁed at least four such cases; one in the Letpadaung
copper mine, one in Shwe Bo Township in Sagaing Division and two cases are in Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay
Division.
71Author interview with lawyer on 15 August 2015.
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are diverse and tend to cooperate in a ﬂuid and informal manner based on the needs of each case.
They include farmers associations, political groups such as the 88 Generation Students Move-
ment, political parties, NGOs, and charismatic leaders such as monks. In successful negotiations,
farmers usually mobilize these political forces to exert pressure on the government and conﬁsca-
tors. As a result, negotiations72 that occur out of court have so far resulted in the most favorable
outcomes for farmers affected by land conﬁscations.
In one case in Taungoo Township in Bago Region, the Myanmar Cooperative Bank was
granted 2400 acres of farmland by the SLRD in 2009 on a thirty-year lease to plant teak. As
of end 2015, the company had only cultivated 200 acres. Farmers say that they have not
received any compensation and since early 2015, have been staging protests to get this land
back. This case beneﬁtted from the legal advice of a lawyer, but what eventually forced the
company to return 1888 acres of this land while increasing compensation by 500,000 MMK
per acre was additional negotiations by a local NGO, pressure from the leadership of the
ethnic armed group with inﬂuence in the area, and the community with the regional
government.73
Local, and increasingly international media coverage, has consistently focused on land con-
ﬁscation cases and land conﬂicts since early 2012. The media played an important role in the Let-
padaung copper mine case, particularly in the aftermath of the violent crackdown on a peaceful
demonstration involving monks in November 2012.74 Partly due to continued coverage, this
became the ﬁrst large-scale mine to renegotiate compensation with communities and revenue
sharing with the government. The new package includes payment of USD two million annually
to cover environmental costs in the production phase as well as two percent of net proﬁts to be
used for corporate social responsibility initiatives for the communities;75 a job for each household
or a monthly subsidy of between USD 70 and USD 160 a month depending on household size
over a thirty year period;76 and increased compensation for lost farmland. Nevertheless, watch
groups continue to report that many in the affected communities are still worse off than before
the project started.
Media has also helped sway decisions of some judges in favor of communities, as demon-
strated in a case in Pyin Oo Lwin in the Mandalay Region. Here villagers had 20,000 acres
taken twenty years ago, and as of the middle of 2014, half of this land was in the process of
being returned, based on the Parliamentary Land Conﬁscation Inquiry Commission’s recommen-
dations. Thirty farmers initiated a lawsuit against a company involved with the land conﬁscation.
When asked why they were engaging with the courts despite knowing that the courts tend to be
corrupt, they replied that even without receiving bribes, judges could be swayed to rule in their
favor with the pressure exerted by media and national campaigns. They credited these tactics for
inﬂuencing the district-level court which ruled in their favor.77
72While this paper focuses primarily on large-scale land conﬁscations by more powerful actors against small-
holder farmers, there are ongoing attempts by farming communities to use negotiations to resolve smaller
conﬂicts within themselves.
73See article http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/18449-kma-group-returns-seized-land-to-former-
owners.html (accessed 30 January, 2016).
74See article http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/wanbao-welcomes-inquiry-commissions-verdict.html/ (accessed
30 March, 2013).
75See article http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/letpadaung-farmers-crop-compensation-demands-denied.
html (accessed 2 March, 2016).
76See article http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/19128-wanbao-prepares-to-re-start-letpadaung.
html (accessed 3 March, 2016).
77Author interview with village in Pyin Oo Lwin on 22 June, 2014.
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State Response
Different levels and types of state actors have responded to the groundswell of protests from rural
communities. At the highest level of policy-making, state ofﬁcials have recognized that land con-
ﬂicts create social instability. At the national level, the Minister of Environmental Conservation
and Forests said at the opening of the third National Land Use Policy consultation in July 2015:
Since the population is growing over time, only with the proper management of limited land
resources, will there be a harmonized execution of programs for provision of basic needs of the
people, improvement of their socioeconomic conditions and development of the State. Land use con-
ﬂicts between the State, Public and Investors, encroachments, controversial tenure rights and unregu-
lated land leases are quite common these days as a result of the lack of proper Land Use Policy.78
The Parliamentary Land Conﬁscation Investigation Commission was initiated in August 2012
in response to a surge of appeals by farmers to their then newly-elected Parliamentary represen-
tatives for help in solving conﬁscation cases. The Commission’s task was to assess whether land
conﬁscation cases that occurred under the military regime from 1988 to 2010 did in fact break the
law at the time of conﬁscation, namely the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Importantly, even though
the 1894 Land Acquisition Act is outdated, many farmers do not want to see it repealed as it lends
legitimacy to their past claims for compensation.
The Parliamentary Land Conﬁscation Investigation Commission concluded that most of the
land concessions had failed to follow the 1894 Land Acquisition Act, which was the only law
that regulated compensation at the time of the conﬁscations. In its ﬁrst report, the Commission
wrote that the main causes of land conﬁscations included: (a) urban development expansion;
(b) industrial zone development; (c) military cantonment expansion; (d) national infrastructural
projects including railways, airports, and highways; (e) state factories; and (f) agribusinesses. It
also determined that sixty percent of the 500,000 acres of land that had been conﬁscated
during this period was carried out by the military. The remainder had been conﬁscated by the
private sector and various government ministries and individual ofﬁcials, nearly all with no or
negligible compensation.79
The actual land return process has been hampered for various reasons. Often, those holding
conﬁscated land delay its return by claiming they plan to develop it. For example, the military
says that a large part of its land holdings deemed to be “excess” by the Commission is in fact
necessary for defense purposes in conﬂict areas. In addition, the process for returning land is com-
plicated by the fact that the land has changed hands multiple times, from original owners to tenant
farmer(s). Additionally, communities have also lamented the corruption among local administra-
tors in the handling of these land returns. Pro-bono lawyers and NGOs providing legal assistance
are supporting farmers to negotiate this process.
Below the national level, state support for resolutions to land disputes varies. In the Ayeyar-
wady Delta, the regional government has identiﬁed more land to be returned than that rec-
ommended by the Parliamentary Commission. According to the current Regional SLRD Ofﬁcer,
The Commission told us to return 27,000 acres, and the regional government ordered that 49,620 acres
additional be returned, totaling 76,700 acres. 44,290 acres have been returned to 4881 farmers;
another 32,000 acres have been given to 4887 farmers for temporary use.80
78Ofﬁcial transcript of speech dated 29 July, 2015.
79See article http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10923-mps-pressure-govt-to-return-farmland.
html (accessed 26 November, 2015).
80Interview conducted by author on 19 February, 2016.
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The Region’s Minister of Agriculture explained:
I am a farmer and my sons are involved with farming. You can imagine which sides we stand for…
For example, with the Ngwe Saung hotel zone, before 2012 the compensation was only required for
the trees and crops, but now we are negotiating payments for the land.81
Farmer association leaders think that the Ayeyarwady authorities have supported farmers in
some instances not only because some leaders want to leave a positive legacy. The Delta has a
history of politically active farmers with which the recent government has wanted to negotiate;
the USDP wanted to win votes in the November 2015 elections; and land conﬂicts have
greatly hindered economic investments.82
Conclusion
I have shown that Myanmar’s land system is governed by stacked laws built on top of each other
over time, leading to legal conﬂicts and contradictions. Even as the country’s top leaders articulate
the government’s intention to move towards “rule of law,” those who have tended to beneﬁt from
the absence of this are learning to strategically use the ambiguity of this stacked legal framework
to their advantage. Motivated by the growing value of land, land conﬁscators of various types
have been able to use state law to legitimize their actions, while further criminalizing smallholder
farmers.
Nevertheless, as a result of gradual reforms in the judicial system, the growing presence of
legal aid providers, and an increasing willingness among farmers to engage with the law, a
small number of civil suits initiated by the latter to defend against land conﬁscations have
been brought to court. Assisted by legal aid providers, these farmers demonstrate a creative
use of stacked laws to construct legal arguments, whose outcomes are as yet undetermined.
But given the very slow process (up to three years for civil cases) and a very weak judiciary
still largely inﬂuenced by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is unlikely that struggles limited to
the legal sphere will result in signiﬁcant gains for smallholder farmers in the near term.
In contrast, most of the gainsmade by farmers in recovering land or gaining compensation have
occurred outside the legal system, usually through effective mobilization of a range of civil society
actors, including farmers associations, political groups such as the 88 Generation Students Move-
ment, political parties, NGOs, charismatic leaders, and members of the media. While lawyers have
historically tended to avoid appearing overtly political in land cases, the linking of legal with pol-
itical strategies appears to be necessary in Myanmar’s current context – in which the law continues
to be manipulated by those with access to more political and economic resources.
Going forward, if the National League for Democracy government prioritizes legal reforms
such as strengthening the capacity and independence of the judiciary, streamlining the legal fra-
mework, and building on the work initiated under the Parliamentary Land Conﬁscation Investi-
gation Commission, the country might begin to see more clarity and consistency of application of
law. This could reshape a society that has been characterized by a “law-of-status” to one that
comes closer to the practice of rule of law.
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Appendix 1: Acronyms
FAB: Farmland Administration Body
LUC: land use certiﬁcates
MEC: Myanmar Economic Corporation
MMK: Myanmar kyat (the local currency)
SLRD: Settlement and Land Records Department
SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council
UMEHL: Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited
VFV: Vacant, Fallow, Virgin (land)
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